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Note
Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel:
The Lochner Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade
Jason A. Adkins∗
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
On September 14, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a motion to reopen the case of
Roe v. Wade.2 Norma McCorvey, also known as Jane Roe,3
brought the motion after years defending abortion rights. Regretful of the effect that Roe has had on women and society,4
McCorvey assembled a massive amount of evidence, including
1,000 affidavits of women who testified that their abortions had
a negative effect on their lives.5 McCorvey claimed that this in∗ J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., M.A.,
University of St. Thomas. The author wishes to thank Liz Crouse, David
Leishman, John Niemann, and the many others who offered comments and
criticism. Special thanks go to Dale Carpenter and Teresa Collett, who are
true mentors and made this Note possible. Finally, the author is grateful for
his wife Annamarie and son Dominic, whose limitless love and patience sustained him through this project.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Transaction
Publishers 2005) (1881).
2. McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 1387 (2005); Court Rejects Motion to Overturn Roe v. Wade, CNN.COM,
Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/14/roe.v.wade.
3. Shannen W. Coffin, A Tough Boat to Roe, Sept. 16, 2004, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE, http://www.nationalreview.com/coffin/coffin200409160630.asp.
4. Id.; see also Effort to Reopen Roe v. Wade: Jane Roe: Something I’ve
Wanted Since Day One, CNN.COM, Feb. 19, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/
LAW/02/19/roev.wade.ap.ap/index.html.
5. See McCorvey, 385 F.3d at 850 (Jones, J., concurring); see also Operation Outcry, Post-Abortive Women’s Affidavits, http://www.operationoutcry
.org/stories/storiesDir.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (providing a sample of the
affidavits). In addition, McCorvey’s team presented new information relating
to fetal development and viability, as well as the mechanics of the abortion industry. McCorvey, 385 F.3d at 850–52 (Jones, J., concurring); see also Aff. of
David C. Reardon, Ph. D., Operation Outcry, http://www.operationoutcry

500

ADKINS_3FMT

2005]

12/22/2005 10:52:55 AM

DEMISE OF ROE V. WADE

501

formation undermines the rationale of the original holding in
Roe, and pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,6 Roe should be reopened and vacated.7 The Fifth
Circuit denied the motion, stating that the issue was moot
since Texas had implicitly repealed its antiabortion statute.8
Perhaps the most interesting part of the ruling was the
concurring opinion filed by Judge Edith Jones as an addendum
to her own majority opinion. Judge Jones excoriated the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence and made a compelling
case that it had to be reexamined in light of the growing
amount of information about abortion and its adverse effects on
women and society.9
Judge Jones’s concurring opinion raises an interesting
question: What do we do with new information that suggests
the decision to terminate one’s pregnancy has actually hurt
women and has not validated the original justifications upon
which the Roe decision was based, such as protecting the patient-doctor relationship, ensuring every child is a wanted child
by reducing poverty and child abuse, and protecting the dignity
of women?10
.org/DavidReardonexpertopinion-Roe-Final.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); Aff.
of Theresa Burke, M.A., Ph. D., Operation Outcry, http://www.operationoutcry
.org/ExpertAffidavit(LASTFINAL)-TheresaBurke.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2005).
6. This rule allows for relief from a judgment if that ruling was based on
fraud, mistake, or new evidence recently discovered or not considered during
the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
7. McCorvey, 385 F.3d at 848.
8. Id. at 848–50. Both the federal district court and the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit denied McCorvey’s motion, but on different grounds. The
district court believed that McCorvey had not brought the Rule 60(b) motion
within the statutory standard of “a reasonable time.” Id. at 849–50 n.4. Overruling the rationale of the district court, but affirming the decision, the Fifth
Circuit stated that because Texas had enacted legislation putting restrictions
on abortion and abortion providers, it had implicitly invalidated its antiabortion statute, which has remained on the books. See id. at 849–50. McCorvey
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, but certiorari was denied. 125 S. Ct. 1387 (2005).
9. In her concurrence, Judge Jones highlighted the fact that the evidence
McCorvey had gathered could not have been heard because she did not meet
the procedural threshold necessary to reopen the case. See McCorvey, 385 F.3d
at 850 (Jones, J., concurring). Jones then went on to heavily criticize the Supreme Court’s “exercise of raw judicial power” in reserving the controversial
question of abortion within its own purview. Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)).
10. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860–62
(1992) (describing various cases that have been overturned by a change in the
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Interestingly, the Supreme Court has worked through another historical moment in which the reality of lived experience
and changed conditions necessitated a reconsideration of a fundamental right enshrined in the Court’s jurisprudence. Lochner
v. New York11 construed the Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment to include a fundamental right to contract.12 This
right, while not absolute, could only be limited pursuant to a
state’s legitimate, narrowly defined police powers.13 The right
of contract was given what today might be called “strict scrutiny,” requiring compelling justifications to subvert the right in
the name of legitimate legislative goals. This holding elevated
the right of contract to “fundamental status” until the economic
crises of the Great Depression led to its demise in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish.14
This Note argues that while constitutional principles such
as privacy and the state’s police power remain the same over
time, our understanding of how they apply in a given context
may change depending on new knowledge, new understandings
of old knowledge, or lived experience.15 Regarding abortion, this
Note argues that while privacy remains an important constitutional value, the Court’s designation of abortion as a fundamental right at the expense of democratic deliberation has been

factual circumstances that provided the rationale for the original holding).
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
13. See id. at 53–55.
14. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
15. This “theory” of constitutional adjudication resembles in spirit what
has been called “translation” by Mark Tushnet and followed by Lawrence Lessig. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993)
(suggesting a mode of the “translation” method that is faithful to the original
meaning of texts); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800–01
(1983) (proposing that constitutional norms must be translated into new political contexts). The proposed theory of interpretation is similar to the concept
of “Burkean Constitutionalism,” see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 619, 688 (1994) (articulating a theory of Burkean interpretation that simultaneously relies on history, precedent, and emerging knowledge), as well
as a “legal process” approach advocated by William Eskridge that relies on
new application of traditional doctrines in changed circumstances, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1048–52 (2004)
(highlighting the importance of changed circumstances in constitutional interpretation and claiming that the Founders envisioned their provisions to be reinterpreted in light of new challenges).
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undermined by the ever-expanding knowledge about abortion
and its consequences. This historical moment is analogous to
that of West Coast Hotel, which held that the right to contract
remained a constitutional value, but one which yields in the
face of a more sophisticated understanding of economics, such
that democratic deliberation must be prioritized.16 Just as the
rationale of Lochner became untenable during the New Deal
era, so have Roe and its progeny become untenable today.17 Roe
should be overturned and left to state legislatures to regulate
as they see fit in light of the newest information.18
Part I of this Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s right to
contract jurisprudence between Lochner and West Coast Hotel,
evaluating the Court’s rationale for its vigorous defense of the
right to contract, and the Court’s subsequent preference for
democratic decision making due to changed circumstances.
Part II outlines the holding in the companion cases of Roe v.
Wade19 and Doe v. Bolton,20 demonstrating that they were primarily cases about doctor-patient privacy and women’s health,
not sexual privacy as is commonly claimed. Furthermore, Part
II briefly sketches the history of abortion law since Roe, focusing specifically on the effect of the Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey21 decision on abortion
regulation, and commenting on the Casey plurality’s own discussion of the Lochner line of cases. Part III describes factual
developments that have taken place with regard to abortion
since 1973. Finally, Part IV argues that moving from Roe to
Casey to post-Roe is analogous to the move from Lochner to
Nebbia v. New York22 to West Coast Hotel because the factual
and philosophical underpinnings that provided the rationale for
16. West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 389–91.
17. See Joseph D. Grano, Teaching Roe and Lochner, 42 WAYNE L. REV.
1973, 1973 (1996) (stating that “Roe and Lochner are identical” and that the
“legitimacy or illegitimacy of the two cases must be the same”).
18. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 797 n.5 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision in
[Lochner] was wrong because it rested on the Court’s belief that the liberty to
engage in a trade or occupation without governmental regulation was somehow fundamental—an assessment of value that was unsupported by the Constitution. I believe that [Roe]—and today’s decision as well—rests on similarly
extraconstitutional assessments of the value of the liberty to choose an abortion.”).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
21. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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each original holding have changed and evolved in an analogous fashion. Nebbia and Casey represent turning points in
each line of cases because while preserving the essential holdings of Lochner and Roe, respectively, the jurisprudential
framework that each constructed laid the foundation for the
subsequent reversal of the latter cases. This Note charts the
development in the Lochner line of cases as a way of demonstrating how long-standing precedent can be overruled in a
principled manner due to changes in factual circumstances,
while at the same time preserving important constitutional
values.
I. TRAVELING THE ROAD FROM LOCHNER
TO WEST COAST HOTEL
Recent scholarship has all but debunked the theory that
the Lochner era was dominated by laissez-faire, socialDarwinist Justices who had to be tempered by the famous
court-packing plan of President Roosevelt that caused the
“switch in time that saved nine.”23 Instead, historians and
commentators have argued that the shift in constitutional values from Lochner to West Coast Hotel was the result of developments in legal, economic, and political theory, as well as the
harsh realities of economic life during the Great Depression.24
Taken together, these factors were a powerful reason for the
constitutional development embodied in West Coast Hotel.25
23. See, e.g., MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER:
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860–1910, at 127–29
(2004) (refuting the progressive myth that the Justices of the Lochner era were
Spencerian Social Darwinists); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3–6 (1998); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, at 193–98
(1991); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 14–15
(2000); David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to
the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
24. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 7; HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at
204; WHITE, supra note 23, at 203–04.
25. A proper understanding of the shift in constitutional values during the
New Deal based upon changed circumstances can be found in Lawrence Lessig’s article, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 395, 453 (1995). Lessig’s account of the New Deal as constitutional
“translation” is crucial because it demonstrates that both economic liberty and
the police power remained important values; however, their application had to
be reconsidered in light of a change of facts and the continued viability of the
legal doctrine based on those facts. Id. at 460–61 (reading West Coast Hotel in
light of this theory).
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A. LOCHNER V. NEW YORK
In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York
law that limited bakers’ working hours.26 While it is often
taught as a case that enshrined the values of big business, at
the time it was hailed as a victory for workers against the corrupt machinations and Tammany Hall politics of legislators
and labor unions.27 The case was primarily a victory for those
workers who wanted to earn the wages for which they could
contract. If they wanted to work longer hours than the statutory limit, they could. In other words, the case was a classic example of a dominant philosophy of economic “choice” and the
moral autonomy of the individual—the right to choose one’s
hours, profession, and wage.28
Lochner contains three competing models of economic liberty: the majority opinion by Justice Rufus Peckham; the dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.; and the dissent by
Justice John Marshall Harlan.29 In large part, the majority
opinion was a reaffirmation of long-cherished constitutional
values—the values of the state’s police power and the liberty of
contract.30 The right to make a contract in one’s business endeavors was not new, having been enunciated almost seven
years earlier in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.31 Lochner reaffirmed Allgeyer by holding that freedom of contract is a basic right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

26. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
27. See Bernstein, supra note 23, at 347–48.
28. See BAILEY, supra note 23, at 160–61 (noting the importance of freedom of contract in upholding a system of moral accountability).
29. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 54–56.
[T]hree modes of reviewing legislation curtailing contractual liberty
emerged in Lochner. Eight of the Justices shared common ideological
commitments concerning liberty of contract and special legislation,
and agreed on the analytic categories to be deployed to further those
commitments. The dispute between Harlan and Peckham was over
which branch of government should have the final say with respect to
legislation that could reasonably be viewed as either consistent or inconsistent with those commitments. Holmes alone rejected the commitments, the categories and the vocabulary of substantive due process.
Id. at 56.
30. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53–54 (describing the Court’s traditional doctrines regarding liberty of contract and the role of the police power).
31. 165 U.S. 578, 590–92 (1897).
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ment.32 But at the same time, the case protected the particular
liberty interest in an unprecedented manner. It went a step
further by saying that it was the judiciary’s role to scrutinize
carefully legislation interfering with the freedom of contract to
make sure that it served a valid police purpose, thus imparting
a sort of “strict scrutiny” standard of review.33
In its holding, the Court sought to protect economic liberties against legislation aimed at curtailing them during the
Populist era.34 The majority opinion’s elevation of one constitutional value (liberty of contract) over another (legitimate police
power action) was the establishment of a particular philosophical anthropology35 that would guide the Court for over thirty
years in deciding cases dealing with economic liberties.36 At the
heart of Lochner is the vision of the human person as one with

32. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
33. Id. at 56.
34. See id. at 64; see also BAILEY, supra note 23, at 147 (noting that the
Justices of the Lochner era viewed social welfare legislation as inimical to both
the individual and the common good because it produced corrupted individuals
and immoral or antisocial behavior). If the police power were to go unchecked,
the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment was to have no meaning. This was
less a defense of business interests than the Court’s attempt to salvage a particular understanding of political economy. See id. at 113 (describing the two
axiomatic principles of political economy that guided the Court).
35. See BAILEY, supra note 23, at 142 (noting the connection between economic liberty, character, and human development that was a bedrock principle
of Lochner-era political economy). For the pro-Lochner Justices, the last relics
of the neoclassical school of political economy, economics was less a science of
empirical fact than a branch of moral philosophy. Thus, economics was tied to
philosophical conceptions about rights and freedoms, rather than to discussions of wealth maximization, development, and social welfare. See id. (describing the academic moral philosophy that integrated economic theory and
psychology into an anthropology that valued freedom, autonomy, and moral
virtue). However, as the science of economics developed after Lochner, the
Court’s jurisprudence developed with it. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at
204; Lessig, supra note 25, at 420–22, 468–69 (describing how changes in economic theory led to a “translation” of constitutional doctrines into new contexts). Changes in theory, as well as in facts, are also catalysts for a reorientation of enduring constitutional values. See id. at 453, 460–61.
36. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 171 (“The language of substantive
due process spoke not of substantive regulatory standards but rather of individual constitutional right. Individuals were said to possess a ‘liberty of contract’ that gave them freedom from governmental interference—in this case,
freedom to make choices affecting individual economic status.”); id. at 204
(“The courts of the substantive due process era were guided by prevailing scientific doctrines much as courts are today. . . . When the dominant American
economic ideology changed—not until the first three decades of the twentieth
century—the legal ideology followed close behind.”).
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a degree of autonomy and freedom—one might argue a natural
right—to contract his labor and services in the way he wishes,
subject only to reasonable police power limitations.37
In a famous dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes criticized the Court for reading a particular political and economic
theory into the Constitution.38 Furthermore, he criticized what
would later come to be known as substantive due process because it was an invitation to read rights into the Constitution
that were not really there.39 In terms of the validity of economic
legislation, Holmes believed that the Constitution required
complete deference to the legislatures except in egregious violations of rights that had always been part of the nation’s traditions.40 Holmes’s theory left little room for the protection of
economic liberties and even implied that they cannot be found
within the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
While the majority opinion and Holmes’s dissent represent
the polar extremes in the debate over substantive due process,
it was Justice Harlan’s approach in Lochner that later provided
the rationale for its eventual reversal in West Coast Hotel.
Harlan’s dissent is notable because, while it acknowledges the
competing constitutional values, it seeks to give priority to legislative enactments rather than judicially created liberty inter-

37. See id. at 74 (“Liberty of contract and other rights recognized under
the fourteenth amendment were not merely economic rights but moral and religious rights as well. Laissez-faire ideology was an important part of the religious individualism and self-determination that developed in America during
the early nineteenth century.”).
38. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 182 (“The Progressives’ rejection of classicism provided
the excuse, not the reason, for the passage of reform legislation. But Holmes’s
accusation that the majority relied on an obsolete economic theory is not
nearly as important or as interesting as his recognition that it relied on an
economic theory, whether right or wrong, obsolete or current.”).
39. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 75–76 (“I think that the word liberty in the 14th Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”).
41. Eventually, Holmes’s vision of extreme judicial deference in economic
matters would become part of constitutional law in the case of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wickard would signal the very end of economic substantive due process and the almost total dominance of the police power. See
JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 144–45 (2003) (“After West Coast Hotel, the liberty of contract
is never used again by the Supreme Court to strike a statute . . . .”).
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ests.42 Rather than subjecting regulations of individual liberties
to strict scrutiny, Harlan advocated judicial deference to the
legislature as the chief finder of fact and endowed with the
most institutional competence.43 While protecting individual
liberties remained an important constitutional value, that goal
would be subject to the common good, and only arbitrary and
unreasonable regulations would be struck down.44
It would take some time for Harlan’s theory to gain traction as the economic conditions for the twenty-five years following Lochner seemed to confirm the validity of the neoclassical
economics espoused by the majority of the Justices.45 However,
as the economic situation deteriorated and neoclassical political
economy waned as a legitimate theory,46 Harlan’s approach became a plausible alternative. Its merit was that it protected individual liberties without abandoning the constitutional doctrine that there were unenumerated economic liberties in the

42. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72–73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 68; see also STONER, supra note 41, at 138 (“Harlan’s
Lochner dissent is not a dispute with the Court over jurisprudence, but a debate over whether the New York law was valid as a health regulation
. . . against a majority convinced that the health rationale was a pretense covering favoritism for the laboring class.”).
44. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67; see also John Marshall Harlan, Supreme
Court Justice, Remarks at a banquet given by the bar of the Sixth Federal
Circuit Court at Cincinnati (Oct. 3, 1896), in The Supreme Court of the United
States and its Work, 30 AM. L. REV. 900 (1896), reprinted in part in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT: OFF-THE-BENCH COMMENTARY BY THE
JUSTICES 118, 118–21 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1963); BAILEY, supra note 23, at
126–27 (describing how Harlan attacked unrestrained majoritarianism, but
sought to protect the will of the people as embodied in the legislature).
45. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 77 (“More than one Supreme Court
justice attacked wage and hour legislation by arguing that the laboring class
did not want such laws.”). “For example, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital
(1923) Justice Sutherland took judicial notice of the fact that wages in the
United States were increasing; as a result, minimum wage laws were bad policy.” Id. at 184. While Sutherland continued to uphold the right to contract
and vigorously dissented in West Coast Hotel, his opinions demonstrate an understanding of the need to apply constitutional doctrines to changing scientific, economic and technological circumstances and knowledge. Thus, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390–91 (1926), Sutherland
upheld a municipal zoning plan on the grounds that the community has an
interest in protecting the health of its citizens, citing the need for constitutional adaptation to modern urban life. See also STONER, supra note 41, at
141–42 (noting the similarity between Sutherland’s holdings and Hughes’s
opinion in West Coast Hotel).
46. See Lessig, supra note 25, at 468 (describing the displacement of noninterventionist economic theory during the 1930s).
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 At the
same time, these liberties, which were usually judicial gloss on
a text,48 would be subject to the common good. Of course, when
Lochner was overruled, the pro-Lochner Justices interpreted
their colleagues to be saying that the Constitution changes over
time.49 They assumed that the Constitution reflected fixed principles and believed other Justices did as well. However, it was
not that constitutional principles or doctrines changed—there
were economic liberties in the Due Process Clause, and the police power was an important political tool to achieve the legislative ends—but changes in the economic conditions of society
forced a new application of them.50
B. ADKINS V. CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
The holding of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District
of Columbia51 strengthened Lochner and provided a fartherreaching defense of the liberty of contract. While recognizing
the validity of the state’s police power, the Court asserted that
a minimum wage law for adult women served no valid police
purpose.52 In addition, the Court stated that “the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual
protected by this [Due Process] clause, [and] is settled by the
decisions of this Court and is no longer open to question.”53
While in some cases interference with the right to contract was
found to be appropriate,54 the Court rested its holding on a particular philosophical anthropology of the human person and
47. See BAILEY, supra note 23, at 169–73 (outlining Harlan’s dissent and
stating that he “preferred leaving to the legislature the task of finding wise
means to fulfill its obligations to society”).
48. See WHITE, supra note 23, at 243–44.
49. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“It is urged that the question involved should now receive
fresh consideration, among other reasons, because of ‘the economic conditions
which have supervened’; but the meaning of the Constitution does not change
with the ebb and flow of economic events.”). But cf. supra note 45 (noting Justice Sutherland’s willingness to adapt constitutional doctrines to the needs of
modern life).
50. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 91.
51. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388–400 (1937).
52. Id. at 544–45, 553–61.
53. Id. at 545.
54. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–23 (1908) (upholding a
maximum-hours law for women).
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that theory’s consonant natural rights.55 Justice Sutherland
grounded his opinion in Adkins in moral terminology upholding
the liberty of contract, along with the societal good that was to
be achieved by sustaining the logic of economic choice.56
In another strong dissent, Justice Holmes decried the decision for finding a fundamental constitutional right in what was
merely a gloss on the constitutional text. He noted that,
“[c]ontract is not specially mentioned in the text that we have
to construe. It is merely an example of doing what you want to
do, embodied in the word liberty.”57 Justice Holmes articulated
a powerful critique of substantive due process jurisprudence: it
reads rights into the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause that simply do not exist.
C. NEBBIA V. NEW YORK
Nebbia v. New York58 called into question the holdings in
Lochner and Adkins. In Nebbia, the Court upheld price controls
on milk established by the New York Milk Control Board.59 The
case demonstrated that the orientation of constitutional values
embodied in Lochner and Adkins began to shift in the face of
the political factors that allegedly led to the Court’s change of
heart about protecting economic liberties.60 Nebbia was the
first sign of the jurisprudential transition that would take place
in West Coast Hotel.61
Prior to Nebbia, the Court had erected a number of formal
categories to distinguish particular types of economic activity.62
It did so to maintain both the perception and the reality that
some economic activity was beyond regulation, while upholding
Populist-era social legislation. The court wished to preserve the
55. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545–46, 561; see also BAILEY, supra note 23, at
169–72 (explaining the philosophical rationale behind the holding in Lochner).
56. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 559–61; cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 25–26
(1915) (holding that it was not a legitimate exercise of the police power for the
government to attempt to equalize bargaining power between employer and
employee); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (noting that “it is
not within the functions of government—at least in the absence of contract between the parties—to compel any person in the course of his business and
against his will to accept or retain the personal services of another . . . .”).
57. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
59. Id. at 536–39.
60. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 79–83.
61. See id. at 82–83.
62. See id. at 47–59.
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classical jurisprudence that had guided the nation’s affairs and
culture since the Civil War, without sacrificing its popular legitimacy by striking down important legislation. This framework allowed the Court to appear principled while being extremely pragmatic. Although this jurisprudence may have
worked in a simple economy, with the Industrial Revolution
and the advent of sophisticated financial instruments, those
distinctions appeared arbitrary.63
The so-called “principle of neutrality” was an embodiment
of the Court’s pre-Nebbia framework. Regulation of business
and industry that had a particular public purpose or nature
could be regulated under the police power because a public interest was involved.64 However, the principle of neutrality prohibited the Court from meddling in purely private business affairs because judicial umpiring would give advantage to one
economic actor over another.65 Not only would this be unfair
from a legal standpoint, it would violate prevailing economic
orthodoxy.66 However, as economic affairs and regulation became more complex, these categories were not particularly useful and handicapped what was considered a vital New Deal
regulatory agenda.67
63. See id. at 52–55 (describing the incoherence of maintaining a system
of formal categories of economic regulation). Similar problems would plague
the Court’s trimester framework established in Roe, and later abandoned in
the abortion-era equivalent of Nebbia: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey. See infra notes 98–115 and accompanying text.
64. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 54–55.
65. See id. at 47; see also WHITE, supra note 23, at 203 (describing Cushman’s analysis of the public/private distinction and the principle of neutrality
in the Court’s jurisprudence).
66. Cf. CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 47 (discussing distinctions between
public and private spheres and the principle of neutrality). Police powers jurisprudence from the Founding to the Lochner era was limited by the principle
of radical equality, strengthened after the Civil War amendments, which
sought to prevent a “factional politics.” See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE 61–64 (1993). Thus, during the rapid industrialization of the
nineteenth century, courts took extreme care not to allow legislation that favored one group over another. See id. This sacrosanct principle remained intact until the fact of increasing economic inequality undermined the theory
and made it untenable. Nebbia is the first sign of the new constitutional era
ushered in by West Coast Hotel. See generally id. at 61–146 (describing the
tension between judges that maintained the classical jurisprudence, and the
unstable economic conditions and class tensions that appeared to necessitate a
break with the old order and allow class-based legislation). Liberty of contract
was linked inextricably with class-based legislation. Id. at 114.
67. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531–33 (1934).
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The Nebbia Court tore down this wall between private and
public businesses by recasting the phrase “affected with a public interest,” as simply meaning “subject to the exercise of the
police power.”68 Thus, while regulations could not be unreasonable and arbitrary (the Court still maintained its commitment
to long-standing constitutional values), every sort of private
business could theoretically come under the purview of the police power.69 The Court in Nebbia confined itself to the specific
question of whether New York State could put price controls on
milk sales, deemed the milk industry to have a significant public component, and left the broader question of whether all
business activities were subject to the police power for another
day.70 However, Nebbia lowered the level of scrutiny some legislative enactments would receive, giving them deferential review along the model of Harlan’s dissent in Lochner, and perhaps even going a step further by noting the Court’s
institutional incompetence to deal with such matters.71
D. WEST COAST HOTEL CO. V. PARRISH
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish72 sounded the death knell
for Lochner and Adkins. Upholding a state minimum wage law
for women, the Court specifically overruled Adkins and repudiated the judicial gloss on the “liberty” cited in the Due Process
Clause that had been the basis for the previously asserted right
to contract.73 The Court stated:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law . . . . Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to
the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.74

Justice Hughes stated that changes in economic conditions
undermined the logic of Adkins and required its reversal.75 Fur68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
See id. at 536–37.
See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 79.
See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536–38; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 598 (2d ed. 2002) (describing how
the Nebbia decision signaled the imminent demise of Lochner by calling into
question its basic premises).
72. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
73. See id. at 397–98.
74. Id. at 391.
75. Id. at 389–91.
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thermore, the Court held that economic conditions must determine the reasonableness of the protective power of the state.76
Thus, the tension between fundamental rights and the common
good as embodied in the state’s police power was resolved by a
thorough analysis of the social context and relevant facts.77
The rhetoric of West Coast Hotel is an inversion of the constitutional values established in Lochner and Adkins,78 and an
adoption of the Harlan dissent in Lochner.79 While recognizing
the importance of liberty in general, the Court gave priority to
the communitarian impulses embodied in police power regulations.80 Whereas the Court gave individual liberty highest priority and protection in Lochner and Adkins, the Court in West
Coast Hotel placed a greater premium on the use of law as an
instrument of social policy, embodied in legislation designed to
protect the public welfare.81 While individual states could protect the right to contract on the rationale of Lochner, the work-

76. Id. at 390.
77. See id.
78. See generally Lessig, supra note 25, at 453–72 (describing the process
through which the New Deal Court “translated” constitutional values into a
new context, reprioritizing the liberty of contract and the scrutiny given to police power legislation).
79. Prompted by Harlan’s Lochner dissent, a movement arose to create a
more “sociological jurisprudence” grounded in hard facts to assess the reasonableness of legislation—the same rationale that Justice Hughes would have
used to overturn Adkins in West Coast Hotel. See GILLMAN, supra note 66, at
132–46.
80. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–400 (1937); see
also STONER, supra note 41, at 144 (noting Hughes’s ability to accomplish a
constitutional revolution by working within established precedent).
81. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 399–400. West Coast Hotel and
other post-1937 cases represented a change in jurisprudence that caused the
rise of the administrative/regulatory welfare state. Rather than understanding
law as embodying the metaphysical truths of natural law that judges tried to
“find” through the common law process, judges began to understand law as a
creature of both policy and statute. See WHITE, supra note 23, at 167–70 (noting the various features of classical judicial “formalism”). Law was essentially
made by legislatures and judges adapting “the Constitution to the demands of
current American society.” Id. at 173. Furthermore, liberty and equality—
bedrock principles of classical jurisprudence—were now thought to be impossible without a basic level of economic security. In order to protect important
constitutional values, traditional doctrines had to be reapplied to new contexts. See GILLMAN, supra note 66, at 152–53. These shifts in theory provided
the underpinnings of the reorientation of constitutional values in the West
Coast Hotel decision. See Lessig, supra note 25, at 461–62 (stating that developments in legal and economic theory were part of the process of “translating”
constitutional values during the New Deal era).
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ing model with regard to the Federal Constitution became deference to the state legislatures and Congress.
One can see in the cases from Lochner to West Coast Hotel
a shift in emphasis of particular constitutional values in light
of the economic situation that faced the nation. An examination
of the abortion cases and the growth in knowledge about abortion in general since 1973 is necessary before exploring why the
experience of the Lochner era provides an important lesson and
precedent for reexamining the Court’s abortion jurisprudence
since Roe.
II. THE LOGIC WITHIN: ROE & CASEY
CHART THEIR OWN DEMISE?
The companion cases Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton that
overturned the abortion laws of all fifty states in 1973 were just
two of the many challenges to state abortion laws working their
way through the courts.82 While the fight over abortion has
been framed as a struggle over women’s equality and sexual
privacy, Roe and Doe were originally conceived in the courts as
a question of doctor-patient privacy.83 The abortion question
rose to national prominence primarily because of health concerns affecting women and the purported ban on doctors from
dealing with them effectively, in some cases even being prosecuted for providing abortions to women with real health risks.84
Doctors needed to help their patients survive, and women had
the right to receive an abortion if the woman and her doctor so
decided. The holdings of Roe and Doe were more about giving
doctors options in treatment than winning a battle for women’s
sexual freedom.85 This is particularly important because if Roe

82. Lucinda M. Finley, The Story of Roe v. Wade: From a Garage Sale for
Women’s Lib, to the Supreme Court, to Political Turmoil, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW STORIES 359, 360–61 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
83. See id. at 389–97.
84. Id. at 367–74.
85. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the opinions, had served as legal counsel
to the Mayo Clinic and was sensitive to the needs of physicians. See Linda
Greenhouse, The Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 10, 2005, at 30.
Blackmun also incorporated data regarding the ability of medical professionals
to provide safe abortions into his opinion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148–
50 (1973). For a discussion of how early litigation efforts to overturn state
abortion laws focused on doctors rather than pregnant women because it was
believed that courts would be more favorable to a claim that their professional
discretion was being violated, see Finley, supra note 82, at 376.
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and Doe were grounded in health concerns that have ceased to
exist, the logic of West Coast Hotel means their holdings are
now in doubt.
A. ROE’S RATIONALE
Griswold v. Connecticut86 laid the foundation for Roe. In
Griswold, the Court stated that there was a right of privacy
protected under the “penumbra of rights” outlined in the Bill of
Rights.87 A concurring opinion found a right to marital privacy
in the Ninth Amendment.88 Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion
in Roe affirmed this basic holding, but went beyond the general
notion of privacy outlined in Griswold, stating:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.89

The real rationale behind the broad strokes painted in Roe
are found in Doe, which includes an extensive thesis on the importance of physician control over whether a woman should
have an abortion.90 The chief accomplishment of Roe and Doe,
at least in Justice Blackmun’s eyes, was to give a broader scope
of discretion to physicians when dealing with pregnant
women.91 However, Roe’s and Doe’s fundamental concern for

86. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
87. Id. at 484–85.
88. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
90. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198–201 (1973).
91. Greenhouse, supra note 85, at 30 (noting that Blackmun found abortion restrictions troublesome not because they interfered with women’s rights,
but because they put doctors at risk). Beyond the basic physical health reasons
why women might need an abortion, Justice Blackmun’s opinion noted some
normative considerations surrounding the psychological problems attached to
having an unwanted child, as well as the affect that birthing the child may
have on the quality of life of both mother and child. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. However, Blackmun’s assumptions have since been called into doubt. See George
A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United
States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277, 277 (1996) (concluding that access to abortion and
the availability of contraception have caused a decline in the number of marriages after pregnancy which “accounts for a significant fraction of the increase in out-of-wedlock first births”); see also WILLIAM J. BENNETT, INDEX OF
LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS 46 (1994) (noting a thirty-year increase in illegitimate children); Philip Ney, M.D., Relationship Between Abortion and
Child Abuse, 24 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 610, 610–17 (1979) (stating that the guilt
from abortions has increased child battering of subsequent children by par-
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women’s health is problematic if abortion lacks the effects it
was once believed to have.92
While asserting that the right of privacy found in the liberty of the Due Process Clause was broad enough to encompass
a right to terminate one’s pregnancy, Roe also asserted that
this right was not absolute.93 The Court said that the state had
an interest in the protection of maternal health after the first
trimester, as well as the protection of “potential life” after the
fetus became viable.94 States could regulate abortions after the
first trimester to protect maternal health, and outlaw abortions
after the third trimester as long as an exception was made for
those abortions necessary to preserve the health or life of the
mother.95 But, according to Doe, “health” could mean almost
any rationale of which the physician could conceive, making the
states’ ability to outlaw some abortions virtually nonexistent.96
The Court defined “health” to mean anything where medical
judgment is exercised “in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant
to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to
health.” 97
B. CASEY REFORMULATES ROE
For twenty years following Roe, state abortion laws were
continuously challenged, and most of those laws were overturned,98 except for statutes that prevented government funding of abortion.99 However, when it appeared Roe might be in

ents).
92. Cf. Doe, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that he is
troubled that the Court took judicial notice of scientific data).
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
94. Id. at 162–63.
95. Id. at 163–64.
96. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 192.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (holding unconstitutional a Minnesota parental notification statute); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (striking an Ohio statute
that required any abortion after the first trimester to be performed in a hospital); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)
(finding unconstitutional Missouri’s parental consent statute for minors seeking abortions).
99. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which banned federal Medicaid funding of abortions except in limited instances).
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danger due to the Court’s changing composition, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed it in Planned Parenthood of Southwestern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.100 Casey is notable not only because it
abandoned the trimester framework (which relied on practical
considerations about fetal and women’s health) in favor of the
“undue burden” standard,101 but also because it made a shift
from Blackmun’s prudential rationale for the abortion right to
one relying on philosophical conceptions of what freedom
means, and abortion’s place within that definition.102
The plurality opinion in Casey grounded its holding in the
notion that stare decisis must be respected, and that the presence of liberalized abortion laws had created a reliance interest
in millions of women who had ordered their lives around the
fact that abortion was an available option to them.103 Furthermore, the Court sweepingly stated, “[a]t the heart of liberty is
the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”104 The Court
went beyond a mere assertion of constitutional values and stated that abortion is part of the very nature of freedom itself.
This mirrors the language employed in Adkins by Justice Sutherland, who asserted the right to choose one’s working conditions was integral to the nature of liberty.105
The “undue burden” standard, purporting to be a lower
level of scrutiny than the normal “strict scrutiny” applied to
fundamental rights, has allowed only minimal regulation of
abortion.106 The Court defined the “undue burden” standard as
any regulation that places substantial obstacles in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion.107 Most regulatory statutes have
been struck down or eviscerated because of Casey’s ruling that
abortion regulations require an exception for the life and the

100. 505 U.S. 833, 869–70 (1992).
101. Id. at 873, 876–77.
102. See id. at 869–79.
103. Id. at 854–56.
104. Id. at 851.
105. See Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia 261 U.S.
525, 545–46 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 388–400 (1937).
106. The Casey decision actually upheld Pennsylvania’s twenty-four-hour
waiting period for abortions, the requirement that physicians inform women of
the availability of information about the fetus, a parental consent requirement, and reporting and record-keeping requirements. Id. at 879–901.
107. Id. at 877.
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health of the mother.108 While states have passed parentalnotification laws, women’s “right to know” laws, waiting periods, and other small measures, these regulations are generally
limited by the requirement of a health exception. Because of
Doe’s’ construction of the term “health,” these laws are incapable of limiting abortions.
Interestingly, the Casey decision included a discussion of
the line of cases between Lochner and West Coast Hotel.109 The
Court described how changed circumstances in the Lochner line
of cases warranted a change in the existing doctrine.110 In 1937
it seemed clear that “the interpretation of contractual freedom
protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimum levels of human welfare.”111 The plurality opinion in Casey went on to say that not only did the change
in facts warrant a new choice of constitutional principle, but
“required” it.112 “[T]he clear demonstration that the facts of
economic life were different from those previously assumed
warranted the repudiation of the old law.”113
With regard to abortion, however, the plurality noted this
change had not taken place in the nation’s consciousness, and
overturning Roe on the grounds that the facts had changed
would not have been a legitimate reorientation of constitutional
principles.114 In other words, the Court implied that overturning a prior decision gains a certain degree of legitimacy when
society has generally agreed that the facts providing the rationale for the original holding have changed.115 The Court,
however, made no attempt to thoroughly examine whether the
facts and societal attitudes about abortion had actually
changed.

108. See id. at 879; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000)
(holding that Casey requires all abortion regulations to have exceptions for the
life or health of the mother).
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–62.
110. Id. at 862.
111. Id. at 861–62.
112. Id. at 862.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 864.
115. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1078–80 (noting the wisdom of a jurisprudence that “domesticate[s] culture clashes” rather than igniting them, as
did Roe v. Wade).
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III. THE FACT IS . . .
THE AFTERMATH OF ROE SINCE 1973
An emerging body of research chronicling the effects of legalized abortion on women and society raises the question of
whether Roe was profoundly mistaken and, if so, whether it
should be overturned and abortion regulation left to the states.
The conclusion of this Note is that these new facts satisfy the
standard of review referred to in Casey for overturning longstanding constitutional precedent and therefore warrant a
change in existing abortion jurisprudence.
A. WOMEN’S HEALTH
The opinions in Roe and Doe stressed autonomy—for doctors and patients both—to make medical decisions.116 In certain
circumstances, abortion was seen as a preferred alternative to
childbirth, and thus doctors, it was thought, needed the ability
to advise patients to choose this procedure.117 However, recent
evidence has undermined the rationale for allowing abortion as
a legitimate medical practice.118
Roe’s rationale for only permitting state regulation after
the first trimester was that abortion appeared statistically
safer than childbirth if performed during the first trimester.119
In his concurring opinion in Doe, Chief Justice Warren Burger
expressed concern that the opinion had tied itself too closely to

116. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195–201 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153–54, 165–66 (1973).
117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149.
118. While there is an abundance of new information regarding abortion’s
effect on women, reexamining the information available in 1973 proves quite
surprising. In a Roe brief filed by a coalition of members of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG), the doctors noted that “[a]ny consideration of the ‘safety’ of legally induced abortions must consider the full
range of medical complications including early and late physical and psychological complications, as well as maternal and child mortality.” See Brief of
Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the Am. Coll.
of Obstetrics & Gynecology at 2, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18)
(emphasis added). These doctors proceeded to describe a number of consequences of legal induced abortion including higher mortality rates, pelvic infection, perforation of the uterus, coma or convulsions, higher risk of premature delivery, sterility, ectopic pregnancies, endometriosis, and psychological
breakdown. Id. at 32–58. The doctors of ACOG also rebutted the claims of the
appellant’s briefs that it had been definitively shown that abortion was safer
than childbirth. Id.
119. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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medical statistics,120 which could theoretically be disproved.
His point was particularly prescient. It appears that one of the
underlying assumptions of Roe’s trimester framework—that
first trimester abortions are safer than childbirth—was wrong.
Current studies demonstrate that childbirth is safer than abortions,121 especially considering the negative physical and mental consequences that can follow a woman after an abortion.122
In January 2003, a team of researchers published a study
in the journal Obstetrical & Gynecological Survey (OGS)
chronicling long-term physical and psychological harm from
abortion.123 The OGS researchers found that women who have
had abortions face a number of long-term consequences directly
linked to abortion,124 including higher rates of psychological
trauma125 involving depression, emotional distress, and deliberate self-harm;126 suicide;127 placenta previa;128 pre-term birth

120. Doe, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
121. See David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated With Abortion Compared to Childbirth—A Review of New and Old Data and the Medical and Legal Implications, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 281 (2004); see also
ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN’S HEALTH AFTER ABORTION: THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 85–95 (2002) (providing
an overview of various studies comparing the safety of childbirth and abortion).
122. See ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, THE CARE
OF WOMEN REQUESTING INDUCED ABORTION (Sept. 2004), available at http://
www.rcog.org.uk/resources/Public/pdf/induced_abortionfull.pdf (reporting that
the immediate physical complication rate of induced abortion was at minimum
eleven percent); see also Shai Linn et al., The Relationship Between Induced
Abortion and Outcome of Subsequent Pregnancies, 146 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 136, 140 (1983) (describing pregnancy complications that occur
in later pregnancies with women who have had abortions).
123. John M. Thorp, Jr. et al., Long-Term Physical and Psychological
Health Consequences of Induced Abortion, 58 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL
SURV. 67 (2003).
124. Id. at 67–68, 74–76.
125. See id. at 74; see also JOEL OSLER BRENDE, M.D. FAPA, Post-Trauma
Sequelae Following Abortion and Other Traumatic Events (1994) http://www
.lifeissues.net/writers/air/air_vol7no1_1994.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005)
(noting that postabortion stress resembles psychological trauma incurred from
the death of loved ones).
126. See Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 74; see also Priscilla K. Coleman et
al., State-Funded Abortions Versus Deliveries: A Comparison of Outpatient
Mental Health Claims Over Four Years, 72 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 141, 141
(2002) (comparing the use of mental health services by women who have had
abortions and those who have given birth and finding the rate of mental
health claims for women who have had abortions was 17 percent higher);
Jesse R. Cougle et al., Depression Associated with Abortion and Childbirth: A
Long-Term Analysis of the NLSY Cohort, 9 MED. SCI. MONITOR CR 157, 157
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of subsequent children;129 low birth weight in subsequent children;130 and breast cancer.131 Numerous studies have validated
(2003) (claiming that women who have had abortions suffer from a significantly higher risk of clinical depression); Jesse R. Cougle et al., Generalized
Anxiety Following Unintended Pregnancies Resolved Childbirth and Abortion:
A Cohort Study of the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, 19 J. ANXIETY
DISORDERS 137, 141 (2005) (noting higher rates of generalized anxiety in
women who have had abortions).
127. See Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 74; see also RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 189–216 (discussing the links between abortion and a
significantly increased risk of suicide); Mika Gissler, Suicides After Pregnancy
in Finland, 1987-94, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1433–34 (1996), available at
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/313/7070/1431 (noting that the risk
of suicide was three times higher after abortion than childbirth); David C.
Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Pregnancy Outcome: A Record Linkage
Study of Low Income Women, 95 S. MED. J. 834, 836–37 (2002) (stating that
the risk of suicide was twice as high after elective abortion).
128. See Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 70 (noting that the research team
found that induced abortion increases the risk of placenta previa in subsequent pregnancies by thirty percent).
129. See id. at 75; see also Brent Rooney & Byron C. Calhoun, Induced
Abortion and Risk of Later Premature Births, 8 J. AM. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 46, 46 (2003) (claiming that forty-nine studies of abortion and subsequent premature births have established with ninety-five percent confidence
that there is a connection between the two).
130. Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 75.
131. Id. at 77 (claiming that the connection between abortion and breast
cancer is strong enough that as a matter of professional ethics, women seeking
abortions should be notified about the possibility of an abortion-breast cancer
link). The abortion-breast cancer link is highly controversial, with a plethora
of studies present on both sides of the debate. Proponents of the link claim
that abortion increases the chance of breast cancer by thwarting the wellrecognized protection the first full-term pregnancy provides against breast
cancer. See id. Additionally, proponents of the link make the more controversial claim that the proper interaction of hormones and breast tissue during
pregnancy is thwarted by induced abortion. See Angela Lanfranchi, The Abortion-Breast Cancer Link: The Studies and the Science, in THE COST OF
“CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION 72, 75–79 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004). For further studies linking abortion and breast cancer, see
id. at 72–86; RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 17–34 (summarizing many of the studies demonstrating a link between induced abortion and
breast cancer); Katrina Armstrong et al., Assessing the Risk of Breast Cancer,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 564, 566 (2000) (citing breast cancer as a risk of abortion); Joel Brind et al., Induced Abortion as an Independent Risk Factor for
Breast Cancer: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 481 (1996); Janet R. Daling et al., Risk of Breast
Cancer Among Young Women: Relationship to Induced Abortion, 86 J. NAT’L
CANCER INST. 1584 (1994) (the journal article that started the controversy);
and John Kindley, The Fit Between the Elements for an Informed Consent
Cause of Action and the Scientific Evidence Linking Induced Abortion with Increased Breast Cancer Risk, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1595 (1998). But see Mads Melbye et al., Induced Abortion and the Risk of Breast Cancer, 336 NEW ENG. J.
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the findings of the OGS team.132 Abortion has also been linked
to higher rates of sexually transmitted diseases133 and eating
disorders,134 as well as drug and alcohol abuse.135 Sadly, homicide has become the leading cause of death for pregnant
women,136 which may be largely due to their refusal to procure
abortions.
New data also suggest that abortion has increased the sexual exploitation of women.137 Far more men actually support
the “right to choose” than women.138 Studies show that a majorMED. 81, 81–84 (1997) (refuting the link between abortion and breast cancer);
Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis of
Data From 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast
Cancer from 16 Countries, 363 THE LANCET 1007, 1007, 1013–14 (2004)
(same).
132. See supra notes 125–31; see generally DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF
ABORTION (Thomas W. Strahan ed., 3d ed. 2001) (describing hundreds of studies demonstrating the negative effects of abortion).
133. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion
Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence From Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407, 417–30 (2003) (claiming that legalized abortion
has caused an increase in the rate of sexually transmitted diseases due to
abortion’s use as a contraceptive).
134. See Jean G. Spaulding & Jesse O. Cavenar, Jr., Psychoses Following
Therapeutic Abortion, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 364, 364–65 (1978) (citing examples of women developing eating disorders following abortions).
135. See, e.g., Albert D. Klassen & Sharon C. Wilsnack, Sexual Experience
and Drinking Among Women in a U.S. National Survey, 15 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 363, 376–77 (Oct. 1986) (noting the possibility of a link between abortion and heavy drinking).
136. See, e.g., Isabelle L. Horon & Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for
Pregnancy-Associated Mortality—Maryland, 1993–1998, 285 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1455, 1455 (2001) (concluding that homicide was the most likely cause of
death for pregnant or recently pregnant women in Maryland); Kim Curtis,
Murder: The Leading Cause of Death for Pregnant Women, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, Apr. 23, 2003, http://www.now.org/issues/violence/
043003pregnant.html; National Abortion Federation, The National Abortion
Federation Urges Congress to Protect Pregnant Women Without Endangering
Abortion Rights, (Feb. 26, 2004) http://www.prochoice.org/news/releases/
archive/20040226.html (stating that murder is the leading cause of death for
pregnant women).
137. See The Consequences of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (June 23, 2005) (statement of Teresa
Stanton Collett), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=
1553&wit_id=4396; see also RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at
217–23 (describing the connection between abortion, failed interpersonal relationships, and male coercion).
138. See Quinnipiac University, U.S. Voters Back Roe v. Wade 2-1, Support
Filibusters, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, (May 25, 2005),
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x11385.xml?ReleaseID=738; see also ARTHUR B.
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ity of women choose abortion due to problems in their sexual
relationships or their desire to avoid single parenthood because
of male irresponsibility.139 Abortions often result from male coercion.140 In particular, the right to abortion for minors has allowed some men to escape statutory rape and abuse charges.141
Under the Court’s current jurisprudence, even the minimal
statutes that combat this problem have been subject to withering scrutiny and often struck down.142
One of the major claims of abortion proponents both in
1973 and today is that if abortion is made illegal, women will
have to resort to “back-alley” abortions where their lives will be
in significant danger. This claim does not hold up under the
weight of the facts. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health Statistics,
from 1940 to 1972, deaths due to illegal abortions declined from
1,313 to 41 annually.143 If Roe were overturned today, the inciSHOSTAK & GARY MCLOUTH WITH LYNN SENG, MEN AND ABORTION: LESSONS,
LOSSES, AND LOVE (1984) (chronicling male attitudes toward abortion).
139. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have
Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 169 (1988) (citing the fear of single parenthood as a major cause of abortion); see also Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives,
37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 110, 112–13 (2005) (citing relationship problems, desire to avoid single parenthood, and unstable/abusive relationships as major reasons for procuring an abortion).
140. RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 221; see generally THE
ELLIOT INSTITUTE, FORCED ABORTION IN AMERICA: A SPECIAL REPORT,
http://www.afterabortion.info/petition/Forced_Abortions.pdf (last visited Nov.
5, 2005) (claiming that eighty percent of abortions are due to some sort of economic, social, or psychological coercion, and that most women would choose
not to have them given the choice).
141. See Hearing on H.R. 748 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of
Teresa Stanton Collett), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Hearings.aspx?
ID=90.
142. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908,
937 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down Idaho’s parental consent statute), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1694 (2005); Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390
F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2004) (striking down New Hampshire’s parental notification statute), cert. granted sub nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
Eng., 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144).
143. Candace C. Crandall, Three Decades of Empty Promises, in THE COST
OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION, supra note 131, at
17 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUPPLEMENT TO THE MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT: ADVANCE REPORTS 1986: SERIES 24, COMPILATIONS OF DATA ON NATALITY, MORTALITY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND INDUCED TERMINATIONS OF PREGNANCY,
NO. 3 (1986)).
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dences of abortion deaths from illegal abortions would most
likely be drastically less than in 1972 due to developments in
technology, antibiotics, and the safety procedures of medical
practice. A large percentage of illegal abortions performed prior
to Roe were by licensed physicians.144 There is no reason to
think this would be different today.
Additionally, far from living up to Roe’s expectations about
the future of women’s health, abortion has become a fullfledged multimillion-dollar industry in its own right.145 Former
workers in abortion clinics have testified to a “cattle herd” mentality146 of abortion clinics that seek to be as efficient as possible. Fewer hospitals and fewer doctors are performing abortions, forcing more patients into larger, urban clinics.147
Because of privacy issues, many abortion clinics keep few records, and what they do keep is collected haphazardly.148 Most
women who experience complications from abortion seek medical assistance from clinics other than the abortion provider,
where the problem is rarely linked to, or recorded as, an abortion complication.149 Thus, we truly do not know the full extent
of the medical complications resulting from abortions.

144. See id. (citing Mary Calderone, Illegal Abortion as Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 951 (1960) (noting that prior to Roe, nine out of
ten illegal abortions were performed by licensed physicians)); see also Finley,
supra note 82, at 369 (noting that California’s hearings to liberalize its abortion laws in the 1960s would simply codify “what doctors were, in fact, doing”).
145. See Phyllis Schlafly, Ashcroft Stands Up to Abortion Industry, TOWNHALL.COM, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/phyllisschlafly/
ps20040308.shtml (describing Planned Parenthood’s revenues and government
funding).
146. See Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Houston v. Archer, 159 F. Supp. 2d 414,
428 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (abortion provider described abortion clinics as having a
“cattle herd” mentality) aff ’d in part and rev’d in part by Women’s Med. Ctr. of
Nw. Houston v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001).
147. See Maureen Kramlich, The Abortion Debate Thirty Years Later: From
Choice to Coercion, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 783, 783–89 (2004) (describing the
failing business model of abortion clinics and their push for government
money to stay in business).
148. See RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 5–9 (describing the
reasons for the underreporting of data concerning postabortion complications);
see also David C. Reardon, Limitations on Post-Abortion Research: Why We
Know So Little, http://www.afterabortion.org/limits.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2005) (exploring the relative difficulty in obtaining accurate postabortion statistics).
149. See RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 255–68 (describing
how research limited to short-term follow-up examinations limits the accuracy
of postabortion research).
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B. POLITICAL CONSENSUS
In their commentary on the Lochner line of cases, the three
Justices of the Casey plurality opinion stated that in 1937, a social consensus had been reached that Lochner was wrongly decided.150 They went on to state that the sort of consensus that
existed in 1937 was not present with regard to abortion (at
least not in 1992).151 Leaving aside the question of the Justices’
historical accuracy, their statement implies that polls may play
a role in determining whether a reversal of precedent is justified. Is it enough to have academic consensus stating that a
case was wrongly decided, or is there a need for public consensus? Judging from the plurality opinion’s desire to achieve
some sort of social compromise on this divisive issue, Casey
suggests that the Court considers the pulse of the nation important when adjudicating cases involving abortion.152
The polls, however, indicate that the nation as a whole is
less divided on the issue than is commonly portrayed. Much
common ground exists among the populace regarding appropriate regulations of abortion—regulations that are frustrated by
the Court’s current jurisprudence. In a 2004 poll conducted by
Zogby International, 56 percent of the population agreed with
the proposition that at a maximum, abortion should be legal
only in cases of rape, incest, or to preserve the life of the
mother.153 Another 25 percent believed abortions should only be
allowed during the first three months of pregnancy.154 Thus, 81
percent of the population rejected the current abortion jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. A 2003 CBS News Poll indicated that 62 percent of those polled believed there should be
stricter limits on abortion.155 Over 70 percent of those polled by
USA Today/CNN/Gallup in 2003 stated that they would allow
such regulations as “right to know” acts, waiting periods, parental consent for minors, spousal notification, and a ban on

150. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992).
151. Id. at 864 (“Because the cases before us present no such occasion it
could be seen as no such response.”).
152. See id. at 854–55.
153. Steven Ertelt, New Poll: Majority of Americans, Students, Blacks, ProLife on Abortion, ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 26, 2004, http://www.zogby.com/
Soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=8087.
154. Id.
155. CBS News, Abortion Polls, (July 2003), http://www.sba-list.org/
polls08072003.cfm.
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partial-birth abortion (D & X).156 The information from these
polls reflects basic American attitudes toward abortion.157
Thus, there appears to be a broad consensus that the current
abortion regime is too lax and does not comport with the sensibilities of the people. If the Justices are looking for public opinion to help justify a reversal of precedent, ample polling data
supports some kind of reversal of Roe.
IV. THE PATH OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REORIENTATION
Constitutional values remain the same over time, but
should be applied differently in regard to concrete historical
circumstances. The Lochner era is the prototypical example of
this sort of shift in constitutional values and provides a model
for how today’s Justices could overturn Roe v. Wade.158 At the
same time, this transition need not jeopardize important constitutional values like the right of privacy or the emerging doctrine of substantive due process as applied to noneconomic liberties.159 A new “Harlanite” approach could forge a middle
ground between the dogmatic assertion of a right that has its
foundation in a judicial gloss on a particular constitutional text,

156. See Kathy Kiely, Abortion Battle Hits Pivotal Point, USA TODAY, Jan.
15, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-15-abortion-usat_x
.htm.
157. See Clark D. Forsythe, An Unnecessary Evil, 130 FIRST THINGS 21
(2003) (referencing recent polling data on abortion); Lynn D. Wardle, The
Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson From the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L.
REV. 853, 945–48 (discussing recent trends in abortion polling data).
158. Lessig describes the interpretive process as one that relies on particular degrees of certainty. See Lessig, supra note 25, at 410–14. If the meaning
of the text or the idea behind the text is pretty certain, then courts may rule.
In the New Deal context, prior to the 1930s, noninterventionism was largely
assumed to be an absolute, unchanging truth. In that context, liberty clearly
meant laissez-faire economics. However, as economic theory was challenged
and contested, the Court had to take a more agnostic approach. See id. at 439.
In this interpretive context, legislatures should get more deference. See id.
The same principle applies to abortion. Since the facts and constitutional principles of Roe are highly contested, the court should adopt a more agnostic, interpretive approach and return the issue to the legislatures. See id.
159. As soon as the Court abandoned the old constitutional limitations on
the police power, the Court crafted new ones in the famous “footnote 4” from
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See GILLMAN, supra note 66, at 204. Footnote 4 prevented judicial review from being
swallowed by the Court’s new deference to the police power and Congress, and
became the basis for noneconomic substantive due process. See generally
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 229–34 (2004) (discussing the advent of “Footnote Four”).
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and a Holmesian legal positivism that would leave unenumerated liberty interests for states to protect or not protect. This
constitutional reorientation of values could provide a jurisprudential framework that would reaffirm the liberty interests associated with privacy, while taking the abortion issue out of the
courts and into the legislatures for debate. As with right of contract jurisprudence during the New Deal, current abortion jurisprudence has prevented the enactment of an enormous
amount of socially popular legislation restricting abortion.160 It
is time to return this issue to the legislature.
A. LOCHNER REVISITED: THREE COMPETING APPROACHES TO
ABORTION
While there were three competing models for resolving the
question of the balance of the police power and economic liberties in Lochner, only the dogmatic strain of fundamental rights
embodied in the Peckham opinion and the legal positivism of
Holmes’s dissent are competing today. However, this Note
seeks to resurrect a third approach—a “Harlanite” theory that
balances important constitutional values and liberties, while at
the same time addresses the changed factual situation since
1973.161 This approach offers a way out of the current debate
over the merits of substantive due process, while upholding
constitutional principles that are becoming more deeply embedded in our constitutional framework.

160. Recently, federal courts have reviewed and struck down state parental
notification and consent statutes that are enormously popular, as well as the
federal partial-birth abortion ban that passed both houses of Congress by
overwhelming majorities. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 921–24 (9th Cir. 2004); Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng.
v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 59–61 (1st Cir. 2004) (invalidating New Hampshire’s parental notification statute), cert. granted sub nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144) (striking down New
Hampshire’s parental notification statute); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft,
330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the Federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban of 2003 unconstitutional).
161. This does not take into account a fourth option, which is possibly the
view of Justice Thomas, that there might be a right to life in the Constitution
located in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Thomas has indicated that he is open to rethinking unenumerated rights under this clause. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 63, 68 (1989).
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The first approach to abortion jurisprudence maintains and
affirms a broad fundamental right of sexual and reproductive
autonomy that encompasses contraception, same-sex relations,
and reproduction. But rather than asserting a general right to
privacy, this jurisprudence upholds the right to engage in these
particular practices by framing the right in question as sexual
autonomy (which encompasses abortion). This approach protects the broader scope of activities that fall under the heading
of sexual autonomy. “It’s my body, and I can do what I want
with it” would be the underlying attitude that this theory upholds. If this is the case, then police power regulations in this
area would be immediately suspect as intrusions into fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. This appears to be the philosophical basis for the plurality opinion in Casey.162 As long as abortion is linked to a notion of privacy that encompasses sexual autonomy, states will
find it continually difficult to pass legislation limiting or regulating abortion. This approach also mirrors that of the majority
in Adkins, which attempted to uphold a vigorous doctrine of
economic choice through the right of contract.163
Opposite the rigid commitment to fundamental rights is
the approach adopted by Justice Scalia. This jurisprudence
maintains that substantive due process is a complete aberration of constitutional theory. As a product of this line of jurisprudence, Roe (and perhaps, but not necessarily, Griswold)
should be overturned and left to the states, as the Court should
get its hands off an issue it had no business dealing with in the
first place.164 This approach echoes Justice Holmes’s dissent in
Lochner. Holmes believed that the constitutional text said
nothing about the protection of particular economic liberties,
and that the Court lacked the competency and the institutional
mandate to do so.165 Likewise, in today’s heated culture wars,
Justice Scalia believes the Court has no special competence or
162. See STONER, supra note 41, at 73 (stating that while purporting to offer greater latitude to abortion regulation, Casey’s long-term purpose is to better-ground the abortion right and expand the breadth of constitutionallyguaranteed sexual autonomy).
163. See Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S.
525, 545–48 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 388–400 (1937).
164. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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authority to adjudicate controversial moral issues better left to
the states.166 The chief contribution of a “Harlanite” approach
is that it provides an alternative to the dilemma between a
rigid approach to fundamental rights and a broad legal positivism.
B. A “HARLANITE” APPROACH TO ABORTION
In Lochner, Justice Harlan gave priority to particular legislative solutions, while at the same time noting that there was a
particular liberty interest called the right of contract.167 However, he indicated that unless the intrusion was arbitrary or
unreasonable, deference should be given to the legislature as
the more appropriate finder of fact.168 This approach, adopted
by Justice Hughes in West Coast Hotel,169 emphasized the community’s interest in regulating “health, safety, morals and welfare”170 over the of the prerogatives of the individual.
With regard to abortion, the Court could adopt a
“Harlanite” approach that would overturn Roe, while at the
same time upholding the constitutional value of privacy. How
would this work? First of all, this approach to abortion jurisprudence would recognize that Roe has been subject to withering criticism on both sides of the abortion debate, and has undermined the Court’s institutional legitimacy.171 Next, it would
note the new communitarian ethic present in the culture,172
and then examine the increasing amount of factual data pre-

166. See generally KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUCOURT’S WITTIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (2004) (citing numerous
dissenting opinions where Scalia criticizes and laments the Court’s attempt to
adjudicate contested moral issues).
167. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 68.
169. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
170. Id. at 391 (overruling Adkins and stating that liberty is qualified by
the state’s appropriate use of the police power); see also STONER, supra note
41, at 145–46 (highlighting various Justices’ attempts to apply economic data
to traditional categories of jurisprudence).
171. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (the most famous academic critique of Roe);
Ginsburg Touches on Roe v. Wade in Kansas, WTOP RADIO NETWORK, Mar.
31, 2005, http://www.wtopnews.com/index.php?nid=343&sid=443760 (stating
that Roe went past the confines of normal constitutional jurisprudence); see
also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE 194–97 (2001) (comparing Roe
v. Wade to Bush v. Gore as unwarranted judicial interventions into politics).
172. See David Brooks, The Virtues of Virtue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, at
A29 (noting the rejection of the social experiments of the 1960s and 1970s).
PREME
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sent with regard to both fetal development and abortion’s adverse effect on women. Because of the data’s complexity and
abortion’s increasing number of unwelcome externalities,173 the
rationale for the original holdings of Roe and Doe has been undermined, and Roe should be reversed and returned to the
states for adjudication.
1. Nebbia Sets the Table
It may be that Casey is the new Nebbia, providing the
jurisprudential shift that will allow for a new version of West
Coast Hotel to overturn Roe. Just as Nebbia abandoned the
principle of neutrality that made distinctions between public
and private economic activity,174 Casey abandoned Roe’s unworkable, judicially created trimester framework.175 Casey also
abandoned the strict framework of substantive due process,
and refused to assert that abortion rights were “fundamental.”
The Casey opinion attempted to allow a number of abortion
regulations as long as they did not create an “undue burden.”176
Gone is the emphasis on “privacy” (only mentioned three times
in the opinion);177 in its place sits a new balancing test for
weighing the state’s competing claims of interest in maternal
and fetal health, as well as the reliance interest of women on
the right to an abortion.178 However, it is impossible to read the
Casey opinion as thwarting privacy interests or devaluing personal autonomy. It appears that the Court made a failed attempt to construct a framework where the interest of protecting
personal autonomy was balanced against important concerns
about abortion’s consequences and the need to apply at least
modest regulations to ensure abortion remained an informed
choice.179
Additionally, Casey prepared the way for a reconsideration
of the factual underpinnings of Roe through its discussion of

173. See supra notes 117–57 and accompanying text.
174. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 530–37 (1934).
175. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872–73 (1992).
176. See id. at 879–901.
177. See id. at 883, 896, 900.
178. STONER, supra note 41, at 72 (describing the transition from doctorpatient privacy to general liberty between Roe and Casey).
179. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 960–64 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (describing why Casey permitted states to enact statutes regulating the practice of abortion).
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the Lochner line of cases.180 By noting that constitutional precedents can be reversed when there are changed circumstances
from the original holding,181 the Court echoed the rationale of
West Coast Hotel. While Casey failed to consider what Roe had
wrought, it created a jurisprudential basis for a future Supreme Court to respond to Judge Edith Jones’s exhortation182
and reconsider the complexity of the abortion problem. Examining the facts, the Court should return the issue to the states as
the more appropriate finder of fact. Perhaps Casey is not the
“worst constitutional decision of all time.”183
2. The Holding of “West Coast Roe”
A “Harlanite” abortion holding could come in many forms.
The most basic would be to simply overturn Roe and return
abortion to the states. This approach would leave Griswold intact, concluding that abortion was not part of the “privacy”
found in either the Ninth Amendment or Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Both invasions of privacy generally, and doctor-patient privacy specifically, could continue to
be given strict scrutiny, with abortion being removed from the
privacy “penumbra” because of the state’s interest in regulating
its externalities184 and protecting potential life.185 A slightly
modified version of this approach would alternatively identify
abortion as a liberty interest in a category of doctor-patient privacy, or medical autonomy, which receives nondeferential rational basis review, or rational basis review “with bite.”186

180. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860–62.
181. Id. at 863–64.
182. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
183. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All
Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003) (discussing Casey).
184. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875–76.
185. Id. at 871.
186. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1995) (striking down
a Colorado constitutional amendment banning special protection for gays);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding unconstitutional, on equal protection grounds, a city’s denial of a housing permit
to a home for the mentally challenged); see also Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d
220, 227–29 (6th Cir. 2002) (striking down Tennessee’s casket-seller regulations as irrational restrictions on a basic liberty interest—the right to enter
the profession of one’s choice); Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation
Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668,
680–85 (2004) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Giles serves as a
model for nondeferential rational basis review of liberty interests, particularly
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Thus, unreasonable or arbitrary invasions into this sphere of
relations, such as preventing the preservation of a woman’s life,
would be considered unconstitutional. This approach resembles
right of contract jurisprudence prior to Lochner, which applied
nondeferential rational basis review to interferences with private contracts.
Furthermore, a “Harlanite” approach need not leave abortion rights completely unprotected. While overturning Roe, the
Court could forbid any regulation that prevents an adult from
using the abortion providers in other states.187 The Court could
review overly broad or vague laws that criminalize abortion
without providing clear direction regarding the boundaries of
lawful activities.188 Thus, broad and blanket bans on the procedure would be subject to exacting scrutiny. Finally, the Court
could overturn Roe, but also redefine the Doe definition of
“health” to mean “any situation where a woman’s life or physical wellbeing is in immediate danger.” Thus, abortion would
remain a fundamental right in all circumstances where a competent medical professional deems it is necessary to preserve
the “health” of the mother. Further provisions could also be
made for extreme cases such as rape or incest. Thus, a
“Harlanite” approach could preserve the doctor-patient privacy
so important in 1973 when Roe was decided, while contemporaneously curbing the fear that some states will be too extreme
in their regulation of abortion. Each of these approaches has
the virtue of providing space for legislatures to address the
abortion question, while at the same time affirming basic privacy and autonomy interests on which there is still broad consensus.

economic liberty).
187. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–04 (1999) (holding that the right
to travel between states was protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
188. This proposition seems to be similar to the view adopted by William
Eskridge. Eskridge states that Justice Blackmun’s original draft of the Roe
opinion would have voided the Texas law (and the most intrusive abortion
statutes) on vagueness grounds and returned the issue to the states to be adjudicated on the bases of the facts and the record. See Eskridge, supra note 15,
at 1080. According to Eskridge, compromise and accommodation would have
prevailed, and the cultural storm that followed the decision would have been
avoided. See id.
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3. A “Harlanite” Approach Does Not Jeopardize Other
Liberties
Some may argue that overturning Roe will call into question important holdings in other cases such as Griswold v.
Connecticut189 and Lawrence v. Texas.190 However, any of the
“Harlanite” approaches outlined above would uphold these decisions because of the gross and largely irrational intrusion into
basic and fundamental liberty interests at issue in those
cases.191 Government intrusion into private homes to regulate
sex acts is both unenforceable and an arbitrary and deep intrusion into personal autonomy, thus conforming to the sort of exceptions that Justice Harlan’s approach accounted for in
Lochner.
Additionally, a “Harlanite” holding could take the more
radical step of giving nondeferential rational basis review to
privacy interests protected by the “liberty” of the Due Process
Clause. This approach maintains the substantive rights protected by the Clause, but balances them against community police power interests. Pierce v. Society of Sisters,192 Meyer v. Nebraska,193 and Lawrence v. Texas194 would be models, as each
applies nontraditional substantive due process review to find
arbitrary intrusions into basic liberty interests.195 This ap189. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that a general right to marital
privacy is implicit in the provisions of the Constitution).
190. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down state antisodomy as violative of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
191. See Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140,
1166–67 (2004) (claiming that Lawrence is a “gay rights West Coast Hotel” because it reflected a new understanding of the humanity of gays and their place
in society as it overturned Bowers v. Hardwick and its purportedly faulty factual assumptions).
192. 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925) (protecting the liberty of parents to direct
upbringing).
193. 262 U.S. 390, 400–03 (1923) (providing teachers the right to teach and
parents the right to have their children taught).
194. 539 U.S. 558, 577–79 (2003) (recognizing the freedom of thought, belief, expression, and intimate conduct).
195. Recall that Griswold, Casey, and Lawrence were decided on grounds
that differed from traditional substantive due process methodology. In addition, the opinion in Lawrence does not use the classic terminology of substantive due process such as “fundamental rights” and “strict scrutiny.” See Randy
E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1585, 1587 (2005) (describing how Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion would have merited a poor grade on a first year constitutional
law exam because of its minimal application of substantive due process methodology).
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proach gives broad latitude to the state’s police power, but recognizes its limitations in relationship to basic rights, especially
privacy and relational self-determination. Once again, important constitutional values are preserved, even with a more
radical holding.196
CONCLUSION
This Note calls for a new “Harlanite” approach in dealing
with the question of abortion, and liberty interests in general.197 This approach defers to legislative initiative, as well as
serves as a bulwark against arbitrary intrusions into basic liberty interests. The Lochner line of cases provides a concrete
historical example of how changes in factual circumstances can
lead to a reprioritization of constitutional values. Strict constitutional protection of abortion is no longer necessary, and experience tells us that abortion has been harmful to women both
physically and psychologically.
The question of abortion has unnecessarily poisoned national politics and has prevented important discussions from
taking place on a number of important issues, particularly in
196. Theoretically, however, even the end of substantive due process altogether might not be a threat to basic rights such as privacy. Griswold was decided under the “penumbra” theory that would locate unenumerated rights
within the sphere of the Ninth Amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965). Overturning Roe could be the end of the controversial
methodology of substantive due process and an opportunity to locate unenumerated rights in other areas of the constitutional text, such as the Ninth
Amendment or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally BARNETT, supra note 159, at 234–42 (arguing that
the Constitution contains a presumption of liberty that should allow for the
recognition of unenumerated rights, particularly within the Ninth Amendment).
197. The key to the return of a “Harlanite” approach is Justice Anthony
Kennedy. Kennedy’s opinions represent a “Harlanite” strain within the Court
because he seeks to preserve liberties against arbitrary intrusions; however,
he works outside the typical framework of substantive due process. His opinion in Lawrence v. Texas is a perfect example of a narrow holding that
preserves a basic liberty interest without pulling the carpet out from underneath the police power. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–79. Likewise, he has
shown great dissatisfaction with how Casey has been applied, and seems willing to revisit the question, especially in light of his about-face in the death
penalty cases. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1187–2000 (2005) (holding unconstitutional juvenile death penalty laws). Judging from his dissenting
opinion in Stenberg, Justice Kennedy seems to have wanted to make room for
all sorts of regulations that do not interfere with the basic liberty interest of
procuring an abortion, including even total bans after viability. See Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956–79 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the selection of the judiciary. Had the Court not usurped states’
authority to regulate abortion and imposed an extraordinarily
radical and uniform system on the nation, it can be assumed
that with the passage of time, a broad consensus would have
developed, with some states having more liberalized laws than
others.198 Once the question is returned to the states, this conversation can occur in local communities, where there is a
deeper sense of shared values than at the national level. There
can be unity through diversity.199

198. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1080 (lamenting the Court’s decision
to impose a uniform system of abortion on states that were moving toward
democratically liberalizing their abortion laws); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 375, 385–86 & n.81 (1985) (questioning the wisdom of Roe in light of
the emergence of liberalized abortion laws prior to the decision).
199. See Benjamin Wittes, Letting Go of Roe, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 48 (noting that the Democratic Party’s commitment to preserving Roe v. Wade “has been deeply unhealthy for American democracy, for
liberalism, and even for the cause of abortion rights itself ”); see also Cynthia
Gorney, Imagine a Nation Without Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at
A16 (noting the diversity of abortion laws that would emerge following a reversal of Roe).

